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PUBLIC SCHOOL SEARCHES AND THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

It will not do to decide the same question one way between
one set of litigants and the opposite way between another.
-B. Cardozo'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court has historically been vigilant in
protecting fourth amendment rights. Indeed, a significant feature of
fourth amendment litigation is the Court's willingness to engage in detailed factual analysis. Moreover, the extent of the Court's concern was
until recently exemplified in its articulation of an exclusionary rule in
fourth amendment procedure. 2 This same degree of concern, however,
does not transcend the arena of public school searches. In fact, until
recently, a school official's power to search a student's person or locker
had been upheld without question.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that students are protected by the United States Constitution,' and has shown a willingness
to expand upon such protection,4 the Court has never dealt directly
with the issue of school searches vis-h-vis the fourth amendment. Consequently, the question of school searches has produced a proliferation
of divergent and conflicting opinions at the state level. The harsh reality of such treatment is demonstrated by the fact that no jurisdiction
affords full fourth amendment protection to students subjected to public school searches. 5 In fact, many courts have given school officials vir1.

B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

33 (1921).

2. The formulation of the exclusionary rule was based upon a desire to provide an effective
recourse to those whose fourth amendment rights had been violated. The rule provides that illegally obtained evidence is not admissible at trial. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Modern United States Supreme Court decisions have focused upon the exclusionary rule's deterrent capabilities vis-6-vis police misconduct. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). Substantial inroads seem to have been made
on the doctrine recently, however. See United States v. Leon, 52 U.S.L.W. 5155 (U.S. July 5,
1984); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 52 U.S.L.W. 5177 (U.S. July 5, 1984).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 20-25.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
5. See cases cited infra notes 6-7. This comment is concerned with searches conducted by
school authorities. Some jurisdictions have indicated that the fourth amendment fully applies
when school searches have been conducted by law-enforcement officials. See, e.g., Picha v.
Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1220-21 (N.D. II1. 1976); cf. Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012,
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tual immunity from the constraints of the fourth amendment, 6 and
those jurisdictions which do theoretically apply the fourth amendment
have implemented a lower standard to reach similar results. 7
This comment will suggest that such treatment of fourth amendment protections cannot be justified because it is inconsistent with the
objectives of the fourth amendment. To be consistent with the purpose
of the fourth amendment, a court's analysis must begin with a presumption that full fourth amendment protection, subject only to specifically established exceptions, is applicable whenever a search is conducted for purposes of either criminal or school disciplinary action. To
reach this result, it will be necessary to discard traditional notions
which have permitted courts do avoid the application of fourth amendment jurisprudence to school searches. Additionally, the United States
Supreme Court must delineate any circumstances justifying an exception to the general application of the fourth amendment.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

The Fourth Amendment-An Overview

The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... -" As the language suggests, the fourth amendment
does not prohibit all searches and seizures, only unreasonable ones.9
The reasonableness of a search is determined by a balancing of competing interests. On balance is the government's interest in conducting a
search versus the individual's interest to be free of any intrusions into
his or her privacy. If the individual's interest is greater than that of the
government, the search is unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional.
The fourth amendment also provides that "no [search] Warrants
1024 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (indicating that had the role of the police been different, so may have been
the reasoning and result of the court).
6. The fourth amendment does not apply to school searches. See, e.g., In re G., I I Cal.
App. 3d 1193, 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970); In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr.
220 (1969); Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super. 380, 323 A.2d 145 (1975); Mercer v.
State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
7. The fourth amendment applies but under a lower standard of reasonableness. See, e.g.,
Bilbrey v. Brown, 481 F. Supp. 26 (D. Or. 1979); In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr.
775 (1973); In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d
869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971); In re. G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102 (1972); Doe v. State,
88 N.M. 347, 540 P.2d 827 (1975); People v. Scott D., 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358
N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974); People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App. Term. 1971),
affd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d 153, 333 N.Y.S.2d 167 (1972); State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.
2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977); L.L. v. Circuit Court, 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W.2d 343 (1979).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
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shall issue, but upon probable cause ...."0 The probable-cause aspect
has been incorporated into the reasonableness requirement of the first
clause and consequently the Court's focus has shifted from reasonable-

ness to probable cause." In interpreting "reasonableness," therefore,
the United States Supreme Court has held that a search conducted
without a warrant is "per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."2 Under this framework, then, a search is reasonable, and
thus constitutionally permissible, only when probable cause exists to issue a warrant.' s
Furthermore, it is well established that in order to be subject to
the fourth amendment, the search in question must have been conducted by a government official.' 4 Indeed, the origin and history of the
fourth amendment make it clear that the constitutional guaranty
against unlawful searches and seizures applies only to actions of government agents.' 5 The security afforded by the fourth amendment is
not offended by unlawful acts of private individuals in which the government has not participated.'
Although the United States Supreme Court has vigorously protected the rights set forth in the fourth amendment, the rights have not
been so -fervently defended in the area of school searches. It is likely
that this dichotomy may be attributed to the treatment our society has
historically accorded students and juveniles in general.
B.

Origins of a Problem-The Adult/Juvenile Dichotomy

Historically, the criminal law did not differentiate between the
adult and the minor. In fact, until the turn of the nineteenth century,
minors were subject to all the technicalities and formalities of the criminal law.' 7 Since the founding of the juvenile court system,' 8 however,

10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
I1. Note, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: An Alternative to the Warrant Requirement, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 859 (1979).
12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted); see also Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
13. Coolidge, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
14. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).
15. Id. See also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1921); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 390-92 (1914).
16. See, e.g., United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306, 313 n.5 (2d Cir. 1967); United
States v. Jordan, 79 F. Supp. 411, 412 (E.D. Pa. 1948).
17. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1909); Note, Fourth Amendment Protection for the Juvenile Offender: State. Parent, and the Best Interests of the Minor, 49
FORDHAM L. REV. 1140, 1141-42 (1981).
18. The first juvenile court was founded in Illinois on July 1, 1899. See generally S. DAVIS,
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the adult and the juvenile have coexisted under different constitutional
protections. One effect of this condition was that the due-process protections once available to the juvenile were no longer present. 19 Accordingly, any assertion of constitutional protection by the juvenile inevitably failed.
Fortunately, modern United States Supreme Court decisions have
recognized and expanded upon the constitutional protections of the juvenile. The seminal case recognizing juvenile rights is In re Gault.2"
There the Court determined that "neither the Fourth Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 12 ' The Court held, therefore, that
because "[d]ue process of law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom, ' '2 it cannot be denied to juveniles.
Building upon the foundation of Gault, the Court later expanded
constitutional protection of juveniles to specifically include students in
school. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,2 3 the Court recognized that juveniles as students do not lose their
constitutional rights when they enter the schoolhouse."' The Court held
that "[s]tudents in school as well as out
are 'persons' under [the]
Constitution. 2 5
It is clear, then, that the Supreme Court has favored the expansion
of constitutional security afforded to juveniles as students. 2 6 It would
appear that the natural consequence would be for the courts to adopt
this attitude in the arena of school searches vis-ii-vis the fourth amendment. However, this has not been the case. In fact, student attempts to
rely upon the fourth amendment have failed with a high degree of reg-

RIGHTS OF JUVENILES, THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM § 1.1 (1980).

19. The juvenile court system functioned under a separate judicial framework, and was
"designed to be more than a court for children." S. DAVIS, supra note 18, § 1.2, at 1-2. Central to
the juvenile court system was the concept of parens patriae.Under this concept, children were not
to be dealt with as criminals; it was rather to be assumed that juveniles were not fully responsible
for their conduct, and were "capable of being rehabilitated." Id.; Mack, supra note 17, at 109.
The sole concern of the juvenile court system focused upon the problems and misconduct of minors. The state and the juvenile offender were to work with the judge, both in determining
whether the minor was guilty of criminal misconduct, and in "establishing the treatment that
would be most effective in remedying the problem." Note, supra note 17, at 1143 (footnote
omitted).
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
21. Id.at 13.
22. Id.at 20.
23. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
24. Id. at 506.
25. Id. at 511.
26. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students possess procedural rights when facing
school disciplinary action); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (damages are an available
remedy for students whose constitutional rights have been violated).
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ularity. 7 Such repeated failure is not consistent with the objectives of
the fourth amendment, nor with the Supreme Court's recognition of
other related constitutional rights. The remainder of this comment will
by courts of public school students vis-banalyze the various treatment
28
amendment.
vis the fourth
III.

THE SCHOOL SEARCH

A. Toward the Abolition of Traditional Notions-Private Conduct
and the In Loco Parentis Doctrine
It is clear that most school searches have beep upheld with regularity.2 9 Nevertheless, the law on school searches remains complex.
Complexity arises out of the role of the school official, the age of the
student, the nature of the school system, and the possibility that seized
items may be used in criminal proceedings as well as in school disciplinary actions.30 Each of these factors has played a part in forming the
traditional notions surrounding a school search.
The classification of the school official has been a principal ingredient in many courts' validations of otherwise unconstitutional
searches. In fact, this classification has permitted courts to avoid the
fourth amendment question altogether. By classifying the school official
as a private individual, courts have clothed the school official with virtual immunity from the constraints of the fourth amendment,3 1 because
the fourth amendment is not applicable to the conduct of private citizens.3 2 Consequently, the question of school searches has been
shadowed by a determination of whether a school official is a government agent or a private citizen when conducting a search.3 3 Close analysis of such a practice clearly reveals its impropriety. To designate a
public school official as anything but a government agent is sheer fallacy, as the following discussion will demonstrate.
The leading case holding a school official to be a private individual
when conducting a school search is In re Donaldson." There, the California Court of Appeals reasoned that school authorities have an obli27. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6-7.
28. The focus of this comment concerns public school students; no attempt will be made to
deal with the concerns of post-secondary students. Also beyond the scope of this comment is the
question of immunity for public school administrators.
29. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6-7.
30. See infra text accompanying note 56.
31. See Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59
IOWA L. REv. 739, 765-67 (1974).
32. See supra notes 13-14.
33. See generally Note, Public School Searches and Seizures, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 202,
209-15 (1976).
34. 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969).
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gation to maintain order and discipline so that a school may operate in
an atmosphere conducive to education. The primary purpose of any
search, therefore, is to further educational objectives and not to obtain
criminal convictions. Thus, according to the court, a school official
should not be elevated to the status of a law-enforcement officer merely
because evidence of a crime is uncovered during such a search.35 Consequently, the court held that a school official was not a government
agent within the meaning of the fourth amendment."
The court's reasoning in Donaldson, however, simply begs the
question. To say that a school official is not a government agent for
fourth amendment purposes merely because he or she is not a police
officer clearly misinterprets the design of the amendment. The language of the fourth amendment does not single out searches conducted
by police officers, but rather guarantees security against all unreasonable searches. 7 The United States Supreme Court has construed the
fourth amendment to cover any action taken on behalf of a state or
state agency.3 8 Moreover, the fourth amendment does not single out
searches designed to obtain criminal convictions. It is clear from the
cases that a search motivated by something other than the prospect of
obtaining evidence of a crime is also subject to the constraints of the
fourth amendment.3 When viewed in proper perspective, then, the reasoning of Donaldson proves erroneous.
Other jurisdictions which have classified the school official as a
private individual have invariably relied upon the concept of in loco
parentis. ° The philosophy underlying the in loco parentis doctrine is
that a school official stands in the place of the student's parent and is
vested with the parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities"1 while the
child is at school. 2 Under this conceptual framework, a school official
conducting a search is merely acting in place of the parent for the purpose of protecting the welfare of the student-not as a government
agent for the purpose of obtaining a criminal conviction. However,
there are many problems inherent 'in such an approach.

35. Id. at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222. See also Commonwealth v. Dingfelt, 227 Pa. Super.
380, 384, 323 A.2d 145, 147 (1974) (school officials are not law-enforcement officers of the government, but private citizens).
36. 269 Cal. App. 2d at 511, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 222.
37. See, e.g., Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222.
38. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
39. Id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968).
40. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7.
41. S. DAVIS, supra note 18, § 3.7(b), at 3-23; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (5th ed.
1979).
42. See Note, Balancing in Loco Parentis and the Constitution: Defining the Limits of Authority over Florida's Public High School Students, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 271, 273 (1974).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss3/8

1984]

COMMENTS

One problem that arises from a court's reliance upon the in loco
parentis doctrine is that the rationale cuts equally in the opposite direction. When a school official is acting in loco parentis, the official is
invariably acting pursuant to state law. This is true because although
the doctrine was formulated at common law, it has subsequently been
codified by a majority of jurisdictions. 43 In such instances, a school official will not merely be stepping into the shoes of a parent, but rather
will be statutorily charged with legal "powers of control, restraint and
discipline over the student"" in order to protect against any interference with the school's educational objectives. 8 Once it is established
that school authorities are acting under authority derived from state
law, there can be no doubt that the school official is acting as a public
official on behalf of the state and not in the place of the parent.
Several jurisdictions, recognizing that a school official's powers
and responsibilities are derived from state law, have properly accepted
the position that a public school administrator is a government agent.
The New York Court of Appeals in People v. Scott D.4 determined
that the public school authority's "special responsibilities" and "correspondingly broad powers" are derived from state law and delegated by
the local school boards. 7' Consequently, the court held that public
schoolteachers act not as private individuals but "perforce as agents of
the state" in exercising their authority and performing their duties.4 8
Similarly, in Delaware, a school official is a state employee,49 and has
not been held immune from fourth amendment strictures.5 0 In State v.
Baccino,5' the Delaware Superior Court added further reasoning.
There, the court determined that for a federal court to recognize a
cause of action against a school administrator, the official's conduct
must be regarded as state action; therefore, once a school official's conduct is deemed state action, a court would be hard-pressed to simultaneously classify the same conduct as that of a private individual.52
From this perspective, it is difficult to see how a school official could be

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 701 (1974).
S. DAvIs, supra note 18, § 3.7(b), at 3-24.
Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy under the Fourth Amendment, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 209, 210 (1982).
46. 34 N.Y.2d 483, 315 N.E.2d 466, 358 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1974).
47. Id. at 486, 315 N.E.2d at 468, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
48. Id.
49. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 701 (1974).
50. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d'869, 871 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971).
51. Id. at 869.
52. Id. at 871. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1983) (civil action for deprivation of rights). To demonstrate a cause of action under § 1983, one must prove a nexus between
and deprivation.
state involvement
Published
by eCommons,
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44.
45.

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 9:3

characterized as a private individual when conducting a search. Therefore, the shield of immunity often applied by courts to uphold a school
search does not withstand scrutiny.
As previously stated, many courts have relied upon the in loco
parentis doctrine when confronted with the question of the fourth
amendment's application to school searches. Courts have sought to preserve the doctrine as it antedates the fourth amendment, thereby avoiding the fourth amendment issue entirely. Any attempt to preserve the
doctrine in fourth amendment litigation, however, is clearly erroneous
and results in improperly confusing the doctrine with various statutes
designed to regulate the behavior of school officials. As a result, the
consequences of this approach are somewhat anomalous.
Central to the in loco parentis doctrine is the issue of parental
protection of juveniles. In the context of the fourth amendment, however, there is an absence of parental protection in regard to the student
subjected to a search;" the courts have in fact confused the parental
relationship between the student and the school with the law-enforcement relationship." The confusion is clear from the fact that when evidence is uncovered in an administrative search, the likelihood that a
criminal prosecution will follow is great." In fact, educators may be
duty-bound to turn such evidence over to the police. In all probability,
however, a parent would rarely do so. In addition, any protection offered by the school is not directed toward the individual searched as it
would with pure in loco parentis; rather, the protection is directed toward the school as a whole, to guard other students from the deviant
behavior of the individual. 56 In this context, then, the meaning of in
loco parentis has been misconstrued. Such erroneous reasoning is not
confined to cases involving criminal penalties. It also exists when a student is faced with school disciplinary action. To be sure, when fruits of
a search may be used to expel or suspend a student, the search can
hardly be characterized in loco parentis-for the child's welfare.
It becomes apparent, then, that any attempt to validate the intrusive conduct of school officials, either by avoiding the issue entirely as
the courts do by characterizing the action as private,5 or by placing
reliance upon the concept of in loco parentis," is clearly inconsistent
with both the objectives of the fourth amendment and recent United

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Buss, supra note 31, at 768.
Id.
See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. at 531.
Buss, supra note 31, at 768.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-36.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7.
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States Supreme Court decisions.5 Indeed, the unquestioned authority
granted to school officials has generally given way of late to broader
student rights. Today, it is recognized that schools are not "enclaves of
totalitarianism," 60 and that students are "persons" under the Constitution. 6 1 This being true, there can be no justification for the unequal
treatment of public school students in respect to the guaranty of the
fourth amendment.
B.

The Reasonable Suspicion Standard

The preceding discussion focused on one approach taken by courts
when faced with the issue of school searches. A second common approach appears to be the result of a confrontation between the asserted
constitutional rights of students and the courts' use of the in loco
parentis doctrine."2 As a result, many jurisdictions have applied the
fourth amendment, but have minimized its protection by articulating a
reduced standard of reasonableness. Rather than requiring probable
cause to validate a school search, those jurisdictions which have applied
the fourth amendment to school searches appear to have settled upon
the less stringent standard of "reasonable suspicion." 63
The reasonable suspicion standard, as enunciated by the New
York Court of Appeals in People v. Jackson,6" appears more acceptable than the traditional methods previously discussed since it at least
purports to apply the fourth amendment to school searches. The practical effect of the reasonable suspicion approach, however, is little different from that of previous approaches. The public school student is
given virtually no protection against the intrusive conduct of school administrators, and the behavior of the school official continues to be upheld with extreme regularity." The primary reason for this result is
due to the courts' continued reliance upon the concept of in loco
parentis.
The weight of the in loco parentis doctrine upon the reasonable
suspicion standard is evident in court decisions. In Jackson, for example, the court determined that the in loco parentis doctrine must be
examined in testing the sufficiency .of reasonableness. 6 The court held
that "[w]ithout proper recognition of the doctrine, the reasonableness
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
153, 333
65.
66.

See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
Id.
See Note, supra note 42, at 274.
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7.
65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1971), aftd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 284 N.E.2d
N.Y.S.2d 176 (1972).
See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7.
65 Misc. 2d at 912, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 735.
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of the official's conduct" could not be properly examined; with full recognition of the doctrine, the action of the school official could be "understood and accepted as necessary and reasonable."""
Similarly, in State v. Baccino, the Delaware Superior Court
adopted the reasonable suspicion rule in light of the "'distinct relationship' between the high school official and the student." 68 The court determined that although the student's constitutional rights could not be
ignored, 69 a lower standard would "adequately protect [a] student from
arbitrary searches . . . and give the school official enough leeway to
fulfill [his or her] duties."7
Reliance upon the concept of in loco parentis to reach a lower
standard of reasonableness places unconstitutional limits upon the
guaranty of the fourth amendment. In fact, the purported protections
are virtually nonexistent because such an approach merely parrots the
traditional notions of in loco parentis and permits courts to uphold otherwise impermissible school searches. As one court pointed out, the emphasis on the school official's obligations to maintain discipline and to
guard students from the actions of unresponsible peers is no more than
a return to the "time-honored in loco parentis concept." 7' It is clear
that in balancing the school's duty to maintain order and discipline
against the student's privacy interests, a court will always be able to
find, at the very least, that a reasonable suspicion was present. In effect, therefore, the privacy interest of the student will not be given the
serious consideration which the fourth amendment demands.
A related problem with the reasonable suspicion standard is that
those jurisdictions which adhere to the lower standard have failed to
provide an adequate justification for allowing intrusion into a student's
privacy based on something less than probable cause. Instead, the
courts have merely stated the conclusion that the lower standard of
reasonableness is necessary due to the nature of the school environment. In State v. McKinnon,"7 for example, the Washington Supreme
Court simply stated that to hold a school official to the same standard
of probable cause as a law-enforcement officer would create an unrea-

67. Id.
68. 282 A.2d at 871 (quoting People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (App.
Term. 1971)).
69. Id. at 872.
70. Id.
71. State ex rel. G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 116, 296 A.2d 102, 106 (1972). In adopting the
lower standard, the court was willing to admit that there was an incursion into the student's
constitutionally protected rights-"rights that are no less precious because they are possessed by
juveniles." Id. at 115, 296 A.2d at 106.
72. 88 Wash. 2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977).
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sonable burden on the school administration. 73 The problem with such
an "explanation" is that one cannot be sure what burdens the court is
referring to, or why such burdens permit an intrusion into a student's
privacy. Although the United States Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to the warrant requirement and has permitted searches to be conducted under less exacting standards, 7 4 it has done so only when the
search has fallen within a specifically defined and carefully guarded
category of exceptions.75 Under the reasonable suspicion approach,
however, the courts have failed to articulate such an exception.
At least one state supreme court recently expressed displeasure
with the reasonable suspicion standard. In State ex rel. T.L.O., 76 the
New Jersey Supreme Court articulated a standard of reasonableness
which purports to tighten the rules applicable to a school search. The
decision overturned a lower-court ruling that had relied upon a reasonable suspicion standard to uphold the conduct of school officials in performing a school search." In suppressing the fruits of the search, the
court held that a school official must have "reasonable grounds to believe that a student possesses evidence of illegal activity or activity that
would interfere with school discipline and order . . ..- In order to
satisfy this test, the problem prompting the search must be prevalent
and serious, it must be necessary to make the search without delay, and
the justification for the search must be based on significant and reliable
evidence. 9 In addition, "'as the intrusiveness of the search intensifies,
the standard of Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" approaches probable cause.' "0
What if any practical effect this "new" standard will have on the
question of school searches remains to be seen. While it appears that
the court is willing to require more to uphold a search that it has in the
past, the question persists as to whether the test is functionally different
from the old reasonable suspicion standard. The test appears at least to
be more acceptable than the reasonable suspicion standard to the ex-

73. Id. at 81, 558 P.2d at 784.
74. See. e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-63 (1976) (border
search); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk).
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76. 94 N.J. 331, 463 A.2d 934 (1983).
77. State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329, 428 A.2d 1327, vacated, 185 N.J. Super.
279, 448 A.2d 493 (1982).
78. 94 N.J. at 346, 463 A.2d at 941 (emphasis added).
79. Id. The court also noted that there must be more than "a good hunch" because although there is no doubt that good hunches would uncover more evidence of crime, more is required by the Constitution to sustain a search. Id. at 347, 463 A.2d at 942-43.
80. Id. at 346 (quoting M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979).
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tent that it "requires more than a well-grounded suspicion" 8' and attempts to articulate specific instances which would justify a search on
something less than probable cause. Depending upon what practical effect the approach achieves, the court may have taken a step, albeit a
small one, toward recognizing the appropriate force to be given to students' fourth amendment rights. It also remains to be seen whether
other jurisdictions will follow suit.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The law on school searches is obviously complex and the issues
surrounding the application of the fourth amendment to such searches
are far from settled. 2 One thing which remains clear, however, is that
student attempts to assert fourth amendment rights continue to fail
with discomforting regularity. It appears to make little difference
whether a court classifies a school official as a government agent or a
private citizen. The practical effect of either designation is the same.
When the court classifies the official's conduct as that of a private citizen, the student's claim fails because the fourth amendment does not
restrain private action. When the school authority is designated a government agent, the court merely shifts its reasoning in its application of
the fourth amendment and the search is once again upheld because
(under the in loco parentis doctrine) the student's rights are balanced
with less weight than in the application of the fourth amendment to the
general population.
What is needed to resolve this problem is a unified, well-articulated approach that begins with the presumption that students are entitled to full fourth amendment protection subject only to well-defined
exceptions.8" Because of the realities of the classroom, it must be accepted that there will be a need in certain instances for an exception to
the full constraints of the amendment. One appropriate case, for example, would be that in which the safety of other students, as well as that
of the school official, requires immediate action84-as in the removal of
dangerous or illegal items. This does not mean that a teacher may simply search a student whenever wrongdoing is suspected, or when there
is adequate time to obtain a warrant. 85 Indeed, when ample time exists,
a warrant must be obtained, as the search would not fall within any
specific category of exceptions.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
officials,

Id. at 351, 463 A.2d at 945 (Schreiber, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 6-7.
See supra note 12.
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
One must keep in mind that such an approach deals exclusively with searches by school
which entail elements of dangerous and illegal activities.
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In order for such an approach to be realizable and free from
abuse, it is imperative that the United States Supreme Court deal with
the subject directly. The Court must accurately define the appropriate
exception to the full constraints of the fourth amendment. In this way,
the privacy interests of the student will be given proper consideration,
and the courts will no longer be deciding the same question of law one
way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another.
Brian J. McLaughlin
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